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Abstract
Combining a radical revision of the historical formation of occidental law with
perspectives derived from decolonial thought, this paper advances a deconstruction
of occidental law. That deconstruction is then brought to bear on human rights.
Although occidental law and human rights are shown in this way to be imperial
in orientation, that same deconstruction reveals resistant elements in law and
in human rights. These are elements which the decolonial can draw on in its
commitment to intercultural transformation.
1 The Decolonial I
«Let us return to the past», wrote Verdi – but unfortunately did not set it to music,
«that would be progress».2 That proposition would for many be perverse. The past is
where we progress from, not to. Progress is something we are always coming to, even
committed to. Its indefinite but tentacular telos orients, even directs, the condition of
our being-together. Just who this “we”, this “our”, may be is debatable but its range is
not confined to “the West”’, to the Occident. And I hear there is a country which has
as its motto “Order and Progress”.3
The “decolonial” would incline us otherwise, at least as a first and essential step.
The posited past here would be the Hispanic colonization of South and Central
America, something taken as an origin of a modern imperialized world – an origin
of what and who is to be included in predominance and what and who is excluded.
Like any claim to an historically set origin, this one is impossibly exclusive, but it will
serve to set this impelling decolonial tying of modernity integrally to “coloniality”.
The fusion of these provides the founding force of modern occidental imperialism and
its arrogation of the universal.
Let me just take for now one depiction of this imperialism and of the incipient
resistance to it to be found in the decolonial. José Mariá Arguedas sets the first chapter
of his Deep Rivers (1958) in Cusco, once the capital of the Inca Empire.4 In a sense,
what embeds the whole novel here are the stones, the stones of what were once Inca
1This paper is a revised and extended version of a talk given on 4th November 2013 to the First
International Seminar on Post-Colonialism, Decolonial Thinking and Human Rights in Latin America held
in the School of Law of Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, São Leopoldo, Brazil. My thanks to Professor
Fernanda Bragato for such an exceptional opportunity and for the generosity of the invitation. The paper
also owes much to the intellectual companionship of Tara Mulqueen and Roberto Yamato.
2Verdi 1971, 169.
3The reference is to Brazil: see the note to the title.
4Arguedas 1958.
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buildings and walls in Cusco but which have now been built on by the colonists. The
stones are both foundational of, yet subordinated to, imperial structures. But the
same stones are radiant. They seethe, they move, talk, frolic. Their streets flow like
rivers, deep rivers, rivers akin to primordial serpents. This foundational fusion with
movement and change is later aligned in the novel with Indigenous rebellions, with a
primal or abyssal capacity to sweep away the existent, to sweep it away in a flood, a
flood of rivers.5
There is a seeming tendency for significant decolonial agendas to be more anodyne
and to advance the resistant perspectives and action of the excluded in a relation of
plurality to the occidental modern – a relation which, according to Mignolo, would
recognise that the «Eurocentered narrative» of this occidental modernity is redeemable
in part, having «of course, [. . . ] its right to exist, since it corresponds with the
experience of Euro-American histories, but it does not have the right to be the narrative
for the rest of the world, except in its imperial/colonial dimensions».6 Yet to be in a
plurality, for entities to relate plurally, there has also to be some commonality between
them. One scenario was seminally sketched by Quijano in finding that:
First of all, epistemological decolonization, as decoloniality, is needed to clear the
way for new intercultural communication, for an interchange of experiences and
meanings, as the basis of another rationality which may legitimately pretend to
some universality. Nothing is less rational [...] than the pretension that the specific
cosmic vision of a particular ethnie should be taken as universal rationality, even
if such an ethnie is called Western Europe because this is actually [to] pretend to
impose a provincialism as universalism.7
What this imports is something rather more unsettling of “the Eurocentred narra-
tive” – something that portends the primal dissolution envisaged by Arguedas with
his Indigenous rebellions, a not unfamiliar scenario in Indigenous literatures. To
“provincialize Europe”, adapting also Chakrabarty’s stunning title,8 would entail not
only the denial of an occidental-brand universality but also a denial of the exclusion
on which it is founded, an exclusion embedded, as Mignolo puts it, in the supposed
«superiority of Christians and then of the whites».9 That would be constituently
challenging enough, but there has to be more. Making a proprietary or exemplary
claim to the universal as an ontological completeness obviously excludes those that do
not conform to the terms of membership, but as universal the claim must also include
them in some way. Which point brings us to the next heading.
2 Imperium
The colonized and the enslaved were essential to various imperial designs. One which
became widely accepted came from Francisco de Vitoria especially in his lectures De
Indis.10 Vitoria drew on the inclusive, universal reach of scholastic natural law which
he aligned with the ius gentium of Roman Law: «the law of nations (ius gentium) [...]
either is or derives from natural law, as defined by the jurist: ‘What natural reason has
5Arguedas 1958, chapters 7 and 11.
6Mignolo 2013, 19. The range claimed for decolonial thought and for “the decolonial turn” can be very
wide: see e.g. Maldonado-Torres 2011. The following could, then, be read as an engagement with a
significant and current strand of decolonial thought.
7Quijano 2007, 177.
8Chakrabarty 2000.
9Mignolo 2013, 13.
10Vitoria 1991, 233 ff.
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established among all nations is called the law of nations’.»11 The fact that “the jurist”
is unnamed and that no source is given for the text, which is from the Institutes of
Gaius, indicates just how intimate, just how “natural”, this linking was for Vitoria’s
audience in Salamanca – this linking of the ius gentium and a Christianized natural
law. And for Vitoria this ius gentium included another category of Roman Law, the ius
inter gentes, the law governing relations between different peoples, different nations.12
Unlike the more predatory and murderous of his compatriots, for Vitoria the
colonized “Indians” of “the New World” had affective abilities and subsisted within
the range of the ius gentium, as befits the all-inclusiveness of the universal. By virtue
of being human and thence possessed of reason, the Indians had dominium; or in other
words they had a mastery of property and a mastery of rule evidenced by their modes
of living in some similarity to those of the Spanish.13 These same Indians however
were also different to the Spanish, being aﬄicted with certain gross behaviours which
they were to overcome. These defects serve to ensure the efficacy of imperial rule
when combined with ways of acquiring “just title” provided also by the same obliging
ius gentium – ways formulated by Vitoria so as to identify «the legitimate titles by
which the barbarians could have been subjected to Christian rule».14 He emphasised
two of these. The first emanated from a right to trade, to travel and to dwell in the
countries of the barbarians – a universal right of course and a right extending beyond
trade narrowly conceived to include intercourse and communication generally.15 The
second was a right to proselytize: «Christians have the right to preach and announce
the Gospel in the lands of the barbarians» and that even against their will, conversion
being «necessary for their own salvation» with the barbarians being «obliged to accept
the faith» if it were adequately presented to them.16 This right provides the limit-case
where the assumed universality of a Christianized ius gentium breaks down. The whole
of De Indis is a “reflection” on the injunction in Matthew (28-19): «Go ye therefore,
and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of
the Holy Ghost».17 And as Schmitt tersely put it: «It never occurred to the Spanish
monk that non-believers should have the same rights of propaganda and intervention
for their idolatry and religious fallacies as Spanish Christians had for their Christian
missions».18
The barbari being often found resistant to these «particular» rights, «it becomes
lawful» for the Spaniards «to do everything necessary to the aim of war» to ensure
compliance; territorial acquisition by conquest ensued even to the point of the
elimination in this «just war» of those who resisted, and Spain’s imperial domination
could continue with at best marginal adjustments.19 So, the barbarians were not
only included but were also in a condition of primal exclusion. That condition
was confirmed in terms that even then were far from original and which were to
become more pervasive with the emergence of imperial racisms. So, Vitoria found
the barbarians to be undeserving of full inclusion because they were like madmen or
children, cannibalistic, sexually perverted and culinarily outrageous, and well nigh
11Vitoria 1991, 278.
12Stein 1999, 94-5.
13Vitoria 1991, 239-50.
14Vitoria 1991, 252.
15Vitoria 1991, 278-84.
16Vitoria 1991, 271, 284-5.
17Vitoria 1991, 233.
18Schmitt 2003, 113.
19Vitoria 1991, 185-6, 280-3, 291-2.
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impervious to a reforming natural reason.20
In all, we have in place what could be seen as incipient human rights. From the
mixture of natural and Roman law there is a notion of rights that are enforceable as
such and derive content from a “universal” natural law that is, borrowing Quijano’s
terms, «the specific cosmic vision of a particular ethnie».21
3 Negation
Vitoria’s colonial template accommodated also the shift from a Christianized to a
secular, or supposedly secular, imperium. Whilst still being a dedicated Catholic
theologian and churchman, Vitoria managed somehow to reject various papal dictates
to do with the colonization of the Americas and the division of the world. In rejecting
the authority of the head of the «universal» church, and even though the rejection
was founded on the ius gentium, Vitoria aligned the imperial mission with the proto-
nationalist Spanish empire by way of the Kingdom of Castile and Aragon, the claims
to a national sovereignty being underlined by Vitoria’s invoking here Aristotle’s
conception of «the perfect community», such perfection involving being «complete in
itself».22
This shift or emerging shift from «the superiority of Christians and then [to that]
of the whites», again borrowing Mignolo’s abbreviated version,23 may seem like more
of the same. Vitoria’s “human” with its universal ius could match the idea of the unity
of the species in racist discourse. That sets an inescapable problem. How can unity be
also a fundamental, a total division. But it is the very preservation of the universalized
“purity” of the species that requires division, that requires dividing the pure from
the impure, the exemplar from the deviant, the normal from the abnormal. Indeed,
as Foucault would add, division is somehow primary: «[t]hat is the first function
of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum [...]».24
Overwhelmingly, Foucault identified racism with a «State racism», this being a racism
the «activation» of which stems from the persistence of «the old sovereign power» in its
«national universality».25 «State racism» became «the basic mechanism of power, as it
is exercised in modern States».26 Such a state, national and imperial, in the assumption
of universality takes on a position of transcendence. Its appropriated sovereignty, in its
«unlimited and unconditional power», Derrida found to be a «theo-logic», something
that «remains a theological inheritance that has not really been secularized».27 To take
a provincial instance almost in passing, there is James Pelikan’s aperçu: «The business
of America [meaning the United States] may be business as Calvin Coolidge once said,
but it is at least as accurate and as important to assert that the religion of America is
America».28
A considerable problem ensues. The continuity from a monotheistic Christianity to
a modernity, to this one particular modernity, is incompatible with that modernity – or
at least incompatible with its constituent claim to be able to account for itself entirely
and in terms of an immanent secularity, and to be able to act in those same terms. All
20Vitoria 1991, 207-30, 290-1; see also Pagden 2003, 86-91, 1003.
21Quijano 2007, 177.
22Vitoria 1991, 301.
23Mignolo 2013, 13.
24Foucault 2003, 255.
25Foucault 2003, 239 ff.
26Foucault 2003, 254.
27Derrida 2005, 105, 107, 118.
28Pelikan 1971
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of which is starkly incompatible with a resort to transcendent determination – or at
least incompatible with determination by way of a positive transcendence.
There was, however, a fateful alternative. Instead of a positive reference, a negative
universal reference was and is resorted to and the intimations of it were already at
the core of a Christianized imperialism. A Christianized humanity corresponds to
the unity of the species characterizing racism. But both were a prelude to and force
of division. And with the negative universal reference, division is the more stark.
The entity elevated in negation becomes what certain alterities, certain “others”, are
not. Or it becomes not what certain alterities are. Being “purely” negative and being
universal, the division and exclusion are complete. What is beyond the universal
can only be utterly beyond. Hence there is racism and the irreducible alterity of the
relegated race. Yet that very appropriation of a universality has, as universal, “also”
to be all-inclusive. So the negative universal reference generates an antithesis but then
includes that antithesis with-in itself. The now-included take on an operative part
with-in the universal scheme whilst still being excluded from it. There is a consistency
to this. Whilst the exclusion in its completeness is an utter denial of independent
being, so also is the completeness of the inclusion. To resolve, in a way, what is still for
them an impossible positioning, the excluded are required in an entirely conformist
way to progress, or reform, or in some other way achieve full inclusion. Like the
Christian “salvation”, this achievement is necessarily indefinite.
Here we should return to Foucault, if too briefly.29 His idea of racism was an
expansive one. The idea and its operation are integral to the pervasive conjunction of
biopower and disciplinary normalization as Foucault conceived of them. And to his
instances of these we should, along with Escobar, add the verities of “development”
and the “abnormalities” they proscribe as well as the “normalization” they prescribe,30
to say nothing of the innumerable disciplinary imperatives issued as “structural
adjustment”, “conditionalities”, “poverty reduction strategies”, requirements attached
to trade, aid and debt relief, and programmes installing the rule of law in conjunction
with measures of security and counter-terrorism – the list could go on. As with the
negative universal reference of racism “proper”, biopower and discipline created the
“abnormal”, the “anomaly”, the deviant, and these provide the formative force of
the normal and the conforming.31 The abnormal and such are both “interior and
foreign”, subjected to “an inclusion through exclusion”.32 What is more, with the
negative universal reference the criteria of normality assume an untouchable positivity.
They become possible and persist in-themselves, there being no positive counter to
challenge them, to challenge their elevated essence, except such as may be allowed by
the protocols of their own formative knowledge. Subject to that intimate exception,
the negative universal reference not only enables the posited to persist in-itself but
to do so in a way that transcends and formatively draws into itself the illimitability
beyond it.
Finally, we come to the culminating stage in the advance of the negative universal
reference. In its negativity, such a reference erects no enduringly positive bounds. Not
only does this make possible the illimitability of biopower and a disciplinary power,
its exclusions are likewise and necessarily uncontainable. So, the abnormal is not
confined to the abnormal. Savagery is not confined to the savage. Animality is not
confined to the animal. Inhuman conduct to the inhuman, and so on. “We” are all
29A more detailed engagement can be found in Fitzpatrick 2013.
30Escobar 1984, 387, 388-9.
31E.g. Foucault 1979, 229.
32Foucault 1970, xxiv; and Foucault 2001, 78.
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prone to regress and sin, and we have to be incessantly on guard against it and ever
enhancing of virtue.
4 The Decolonial II
The story so far, would suggest that I am positioning the narrative in a way that will
prove critical, negatively critical, of human rights as the successor to the ius gentium
and natural law (merging later into natural rights). That may turn out to be so, if not
entirely so, but a more oblique positioning to do with decolonial thinking has also
been going on. This positioning does not involve any objection to the concerns of
such thinking. But there is an immediate problem with the contrary tendencies in
decolonial thinking. By way of exploring these tendencies, we may come to envisage
a decolonizing of the West and in the process begin to envisage a different law and a
different human rights.
Back to the beginning now. We saw that the decolonial espoused what Mignolo
refers to as a “delinking”,33 a setting apart from the universalizing pretension of an
Occident that would encompass and represent the other, not only to determine the
conditions of relation to the other but also to determine the other’s very being and in
the process to contain it within certain delimiting categories. The delinking from this
is not complete, and it could hardly be so. What is involved is said to be, rather, a
relation of plurality. Consistent with this plural relation, and as we saw, for Mignolo
the «Eurocentred narrative» of an occidental modernity «of course, has its right to exist
since it corresponds with the experience of Euro-American histories, but it does not
have the right to be the narrative for the rest of the world, except in its imperial/colonial
dimensions».34 But what if, we can now add, those dimensions were inseparable from
the narrative? And would not the decolonial concern to link coloniality and modernity
at least suggest such an indistinction? And would not the indistinction be confirmed
in the generative range of the negative universal reference? And if an occidental
modernity so constituted had now and instead to exist in a responsive relation of
plurality, what would be left of its “Eurocentred narrative”? Aptly enough: nothing.
In the result, the pluralism of decolonial thinking would lead us to the revolutionary
scenario of Arguedas’s Deep Rivers and a sweeping away of imperial dominations.35
Perhaps being, or the prospect of being, in a plural relation with a refractory
occidental modernity has lead to decolonial thinking becoming somewhat infected by
it. Whilst the colonization of South and Central America was significantly formative
of what became an occidental modernity, it is saying too much to assert with Quijano
and Wallerstein, along with many others to the same effect, that «The modern world-
system was born in the long sixteenth century. The Americas as a geosocial construct
were born in the long sixteenth century. The creation of this geosocial entity, the
Americas, was the constitutive act of the modern world-system».36 From where could
we pronounce so confidently and completely on the situated origin of “the modern
world-system” if not from a position beyond the world – from a position adopting the
universal comprehension, a quasi-transcendence of the same kind as that arrogated
by an occidental modernity? By way of a sharp contrast, the decolonial is often
situated on its side of the plurality as intensely “local” with some pointed emphasis
33Mignolo 2007, 453.
34Mignolo 2013, 19.
35Arguedas 1958.
36Quijano and Wallerstein 1992, 549.
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on “Indigenous” groupings.37 And would it be too mischievous to suggest that the
decolonial shares the occidental orientation towards constituting itself negatively –
specifically, in an opposition to postcolonialism? This “darker side” of the decolonial
would chastise postcolonialism for being confined to the academy, too reliant on
Western intellectuals, and concerned largely with the West.38 By way of a happy
acceptance of these criticisms of postcolonialism, I will now short circuit much of them
by bringing a postcolonial perspective to bear on the Occident itself and in a way that
will prove empathetic with the decolonial, the exercise being one oriented towards a
decolonizing of the West.
This is where we come, at last, to Verdi’s return to the past, a return which
can prove as revolutionary as the insurgent deep rivers of Arguedas. In a resolutely
postcolonial vein, one impelled by postcolonialism’s revolutionary orientation towards
history, I shall set this return in an occidental academic engagement but one that
seeks to integrate prime decolonial concerns.39 The modern Occident’s negative
universal reference in its very universality negates its own past and generates itself in a
constituent rejection of that past – a rejection, an exclusion, which is also and inevitably
an inclusion, this included past being one beyond which the modern has progressed,
and continues to progress ad infinitum. Let me now set that abrupt synopsis in the
promised return to the past and then extend this to an understanding of law.
5 Periodization
This engagement involves the intense concern of late with historical periodization, a
concern which has been most conspicuous in scholarly resistance to the relegating
of a medieval age which thence provides the constituent contrast to a modern age.40
That resistance connects periodization with postcolonialism both in a resistance to
relegating the colonized as medieval and in a seeking «to undermine a series of
Western myths of origin, history, identity, and temporality».41 What more specifically
is to be undermined here is the invention, an “imposition”, of an encapsulated age
against which a modern age is putatively set – not just a supposedly status-ridden,
oppressive medieval or feudal age but also the like attributions to various “non-
Christian”, barbaric or savage peoples excluded from a universalized civility.42 In
the process these periodized oppositions, or strands of them, can become blended.
The medieval and the religious will usually be packaged together for example. And
periodized oppositions can also be part of or fused with other venerable expedients.
So, progressivist and teleological histories will typically operate as sequenced or
streamed periodizations.
In all and to borrow from Kathleen Davis’s searing analysis, periodization «results
from a double movement: the first, a contestatory process of identification with an
epoch, the categories of which it simultaneously constitutes [...]; and the second a
rejection of that epoch identified in this reduced, condensed form [...]».43 In this way
modernity is «defined [...]toward the Middle Ages», a period it «will never let go».44
37Mignolo 2013, 21.
38Mignolo 2007, 452, 463.
39See Young 2001, 4 and Mignolo 1995, 327-9.
40Cole and Vance Smith 2010.
41Kabir and D. Williams 2005, 2. And see generally Davis and Altschul 2009.
42Fasolt 2004.
43Davis 2008, 30-1 – her emphasis.
44Cole and Vance Smith 2010, 24 – their emphasis.
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In sum, the definition entails the invention of an encapsulated age as modernity’s
constituent alterity. And that invention, Davis again, does not involve «simply the
drawing of an arbitrary line through time, but a complex process of conceptualizing
categories which are posited as homogenous and retroactively validated by the
designation of a period divide».45 The division is not simply found. It is made. And it
is not (only) a complete division. It is “also” an inclusion – a remaking, a reinvention
and thence an inclusion.
To effect such homogeneity periodization assumes an all-encompassing ontolog-
ical comprehension, one which relegates other conditions to a contained historical
specificity. So, for Davis, the «secularization» conceived in opposition to the «religious»
Middle Ages «turns political difference into temporal distance» thereby setting apart
the religious as «spiritual» and relegating anything political about it to a terminal
past.46 This manoeuvre enables «the sublimation of theology in the ‘world’»,47 a
theology which embeds various deific substitutes in and as modernity. For example
and as we saw, it embeds a sovereignty which Derrida often found, in its «unlimited
and unconditional powers», to be a «theo-logic», something that «remains a theological
inheritance that has not really been secularized».48 The intrinsic claim of a modern
sovereignty to this “secular” transcendence results in its unsettled relation to law, to a
rule of law.
6 Law
Law of a supposedly pre-modern, of a medieval, variety joined the medieval itself in
being fictively recast and contained and thence relegated as the polar opposite of a
surpassing modern age and its enlightened law. “Feudal” is the label applied in this
standard periodized relegation of law. Feudal law, in this rendition, is a law essentially
compromised in its being an entirely compliant instrument for exercising power over
the comprehensively subjected, and as such it retrospectively comes to provide the
characteristics of a whole society or era.49 All of which is to ignore the diversity and
the wide generative range of the “feudal” both generally and when it comes to law.50
And it is to sidestep the quality of the relation of law to ruling powers, a relation
that went far beyond being merely subordinate to them, and a relation that would
undermine the standard modern notion of law as a product of sovereign assertion.
Typically, the power of the prince was more attenuated than that invested in modern
sovereignties. And law was incapable of being ultimately contained within the power
of the prince. Not only was the reach of Medieval law often more extensive than that
of the prince, such law was also seen as utterly pervading the social. Law «became the
most crucial and vital element of the whole social fabric», and that «fabric» included
«governmental principles and ideology», the whole being seen as a rule of law of «a
far wider scope and framework than [...] its modern successor».51 Yet, a seeming
contradiction: the law was also seen as dependent on other elements of a medieval
sociality. Law could not, to take a conspicuous example, «contradict divine law» and its
derived contents were oriented in terms of Christian beliefs. Yet further: this same law
45Davis 2008, 3.
46Davis 2008, 133.
47Davis 2008, 84.
48Derrida 2005, 105, 107, 118.
49Berman 1983, 295.
50Ryan 2010, 509.
51Ullmann 1975, 28
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was also ascribed “secular” qualities that set it apart from any such endowment and
preserved its unifying coherence as law. Contradiction now compounded: this same
unifying entity is characteristically described in “modern” jurisprudential scholarship
as a «jumble of different sorts of law» and as hardly deserving the name «legal» at
all.52
Far from there being a jumble, Grossi, among others, would see law as taking on «a
unified shape throughout the Middle Ages», see it becoming an «integrated plurality»,
and see also the legal pluralism of «the late Middle Ages» as «both unified and, at
the same time, plural».53 Law was the integrating element of the commonality, of
the plurality of communities embedding the plurality of laws. Law was a working
of the community of communities. Such law had to create «concepts which are
entirely abstract, that is, non-existent for human senses», and yet this same law «had a
peculiarity [...]: the intellectual process itself of describing in technical vocabulary very
different experience of real life [...]».54 Hence, this same unifying law was characterised
by «openness», by a «capacity of absorption», and in particular it had to be adaptable
in its capacity to absorb a huge diversity of sources of law including, but also well
beyond the range of, the Christian and the religious generally.55
There is a remarkable resemblance between this picture of medieval law and
postcolonial, as well as poststructural, ideas of law generally. Postcolonial law can be
seen as an aporetic combination of law as capable of determinate self-realization and
law as “abstract” or vacuous and thence infinitely responsive, the aporia itself being
generative of law in its singularity.56 This law, again like the medieval, is identified
with and matches the constituent conditions of society or community itself.57 With
unforgivable brevity now, these conditions of law and of sociality could be mapped
onto the idea of the decolonial – the decolonial taking as it does the “delinking” of
being and thought in its finitude from the quasi-universality, the positivized norm,
of an occidental imperium, and realizing that delinking in a responsive relation of
plurality – a “pluriverse” rather than a universe.58 In all, and bluntly, law is decolonial.
Or, in a more restrained vein, in its ability to extend beyond its appropriation by an
occidental modernity, law is intrinsically capable of being decolonial.
7 Human Rights I
Can the same be said of that legal artefact known as human rights? Human rights, in
a way, pose an ultimate challenge to law and to the decolonial. They claim explicitly,
and foundationally, an operative universality whilst being, and inevitably being, a
particularity. Negative critiques of human rights on this score are of course legion.59
In its classic mode, this critique would find that human rights are based on an at least
complicit acceptance of Western norms of individuality, responsibility and sociality
– norms fusing the aspirant and the actual and in turn assuming a transcendent
52Tamanaha 2008, 377 and Donlan 2011, 15.
53Grossi 2010, 21, 35, 37.
54Conte 2012, 482-3.
55Ullmann 1975, 49.
56Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith 1999.
57Derrida 1997, 231.
58Mignolo 2011, 72.
59For a recent and passionate instance that would situate the lines of critique that now follow, and more,
see Hopgood 2013.
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elevation exemplifying the negative universal reference.60 So, more situated critiques
would view human rights as giving effect to economic hegemonies usually seen
as neo-imperial, and countless instances have been adduced of the “promotion” of
human rights as part of “programmes” of aid and development so called. Even more
pointedly, human rights have been constituted and sustained in a sharp and enduring
division of the peoples of the world. In a like vein, such rights have a weighted history,
one that continues to endow them with content. So, and for instance, Pagden would
trace a genealogy of human rights to Roman law, and especially so with the resort to
Roman law and the ius gentium in the colonization of the Americas, that legacy being
sustained in the subsequent European adoption of “natural rights”.61
This genealogy could be extended, but no matter how or whether it is brought
to bear, human rights involve a resort to the natural and to a surpassing hold on
humanity similar to that evoked by the ius gentium in conjunction with natural law.
«It is [...] impossible», Fukuyama tells us, «to talk about human rights [...] without
having some conception of what human beings actually are like as a species» – without
some constitution of «human nature: the species-typical characteristics shared by all
human beings qua human beings».62 Then he would add that «there is an intimate
connection between human nature and human notions of rights, justice, and morality»
before cautioning that «the connection between human rights and human nature is not
clear-cut, however».63 In a more resolutely tautological offering, Donnelly tells us that
«human rights are literally the rights one has simply because one is a human being»,
before going on like Fukuyama to concede uncertainty.64 The notes of uncertainty are
certainlyexplicable, as we shall see.
There have, of course, been numberless efforts to construct the human in terms
of essential and distinguishing qualities, not least in relation to human rights. None
has secured general acceptance, perhaps because if “we” take the human to be our
encompassing essence, there is a problem in being able to stand apart from it and
thence encompass and know it. Hence, going back again to the negative universal
reference, human rights have been more confidently designated in terms not so much
of what must be taken but rather not taken to be definitively human. The human of
human rights must not behave inhumanly, must not be too backward, too traditional,
too much of “nature” but, rather, be able to stand apart from, dominate and “civilize”
these elements. But given our inability to encompass the human, the search for it
can only be interminable or, more expediently, pitched in terms of a “progress” that
somehow renders the human as both existent and still to be (fully) attained. The
“human” creature that has emerged from this search has been a labile one whose
confident criteria of self-identity have come and eventually gone, or assumed an
irresolute half-life, whether these criteria are espoused as a positive marker of the
human or, more typically, as its negation, – criteria to do with abnormality, race and
gender, various corporeal and genetic endowments, monstrosity and the sub-human,
culture and language, rationality and dominium, among others.65
In all, and given the account so far, such rights come to provide the ultimate
60This is evoking the earlier account of the negative universal reference and the reliance of that account
on Foucault. It may add a perspective to suggest that the distinction between fact and norm, that of the
is/ought variety, is not sustainable here where the norm is not (yet) existent and is more a desideratum ever
awaiting realization.
61Pagden 2003.
62Fukuyama 2002, 101, 128.
63Fukuyama 2002, 101
64Donnelly 1985, 9, 21.
65See generally Bourke 2011.
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instance of the instrumental or pragmatic appropriation of law within an occidental
modernity. So situated, and adapting Robert Williams’ description of law in «the
colonizing discourse of Renaissance Spain», human rights become and are «the perfect
instrument of empire», of a globalized imperium.66 Yet we could now go on to say that
human rights as the perfect instrument of something are also its ultimate undoing, or
even its transformation.
8 Human Rights II
Intimations of that transformation could be found in a multitude of instances where
human rights have been drawn on effectively in the cause of the oppressed. Notably,
Upendra Baxi has accommodated such instances in a conception of human rights as
plurality – a plurality made up of «resistances and struggles» against the «dominant and
hegemonic» position assumed by or through a monist, quasi-religious and «universal»
human rights.67 Not without a touch of paradox, Hopgood charts «a neo-Westphalian
world» in which Human Rights (uppercase) now lack that coherence once bestowed
by the Occident, but what remains operative and even enhanced are «[l]owercase
human rights, a nonhegemonic language of resistance allied to a variety of causes
and motivations», with this involving «a more sustainable space for human rights as
locally owned and interpreted principles for political action».68
The obvious response to human rights as plurality is that human rights would have
no content beyond the distinct and scattered instances of their insistent and resistant
application. But can there not be a “beyond” of a plurality? And that would seem to
be an impelling question for the decolonial also. As we saw when engaging with the
plurality of the decolonial, any plurality has to have its commonality. Without it the
entities would not be relating plurally. There would be a mere dissipation of them.
Could that commonality, then, import a “universality” of the human of human rights
– import a turning to one (in terms of the etymology of “universality”), import what,
returning to Quijano, «may legitimately pretend to some universality».69 Perhaps we
can come to this by making the concern with the negative a rather more “positive”
one. Faced with the utter exclusiveness of various occidental regimes – regimes of
thought and rule such as racist regimes – we could assert that humanity is that which
cannot be ultimately excluded.70 This does not insinuate a completeness of inclusion.
An illimitable inclusiveness, whether incipient or otherwise, would dissipate any idea
of the human at all. What is involved, along with Levinas, is the impossibility of ever
being «sufficiently human», of an enduringly settled, essential «human».71 Yet, an
inclusive determinacy remains imperative.
The distinction, and indistinction, between this inclusion and exclusion could be
intimated in Derrida’s concern with the unconditional and the conditional, and most
aptly when he relates this concern to hospitality. As against a Kantian preconditioned
hospitality, Derrida would set an unconditional hospitality, a law of unconditional
66R. J. Williams 1990, 59.
67Baxi 2006, xv, 23, 26, 47.
68Hopgood 2013, xiv, 178.
69Quijano 2007, 177 – emphasis added.
70Boyne 1990, 152-9.
71Levinas 1991, 128. See also Heidegger 1993, 224-7 – although for Levinas the connection would not
be felicitous: Levinas 1969, 45-8. In terms of the analysis which now follows in the text, such references
do themselves remain questionable by setting the human essentially against the animal. But Levinas here
would be amenable to the analysis and to the gist of this present paper in describing the reduction of «the
other to the same», the subordination of alterity to essence, as an «imperialism»: Levinas 1969, 39, 43, 87.
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hospitality, an imperative of illimitable responsiveness to the other. «Only an uncondi-
tional hospitality can give meaning and practical rationality to a concept of hospitality.
Unconditional hospitality exceeds juridical, political, or economic calculation. But
no thing and no one happens or arrives without it».72 Yet this conditional or con-
ditioned hospitality is also imperative: «the unconditional law of hospitality needs
the [conditional/conditioned] laws, it requires them. This demand is constitutive. It
wouldn’t be effectively unconditional, the law, if it didn’t have to become effective,
concrete, determined [...]».73 In sum, «[p]olitical, juridical, and ethical responsibilities
have their place, if they take place, only in this transaction [...] between these two
hospitalities, the unconditional and the conditional».74 “The law” thence would be an
unconditional law of utter responsiveness to the other, a responsability, to revive an
old usage. This could only be a law incapable of containment. Yet, without more, such
a law would be a mere dissipation. So, that law would depend for its realization on the
conditional and conditioned “laws” to give it determinate effect. The determinate laws,
in turn, depend on the unconditional law, the responsive law, for their own continuing
existence. Through this route we have returned to a dynamic of legal formation found
in medieval conceptions and a decolonial rendition of law – a dynamic supposedly
subsumed within the surpassing positivity of “modern” occidental law.
Turning now to the notion of rights, rights can be rendered as normative claims
on the futurity of a being-together in community. Such rights have always to be
able to transcend any delimitation, always able to become responsively other than
what they may presently be. A right, that is, generatively trajects beyond any
conditioned or conditional determinacy. That uncontainment is the impelling element
of a right’s being, in the conventional designation, “general and universal” – of
its surpassing any determinacy. The human, the humanity of rights, thoroughly
embeds this responsiveness of rights. Coming from within the secular human, the
community of the human, we are not able to occupy some comprehension beyond it,
to encompass and contain it – to decree what its “nature”, including its human nature,
may “universally”, ever-assuredly be. In the spirit of the decolonial, this perspective
would open on to a human rights ever beyond ultimate affirmation, an ever-resistant
human rights. Perhaps the decolonial may also take us through such an opening and
towards a realization of such human rights.
9 The Intercultural
As we saw at the outset, the decolonial would counter an occidentalized universalism
by “delinking” from it and setting it within an “intercultural” plurality. In turn, this
plurality could connect to the depiction of human rights just offered by drawing on
Menga’s cogent unfolding of “interculturality” through which a culture involves a
«basic and constant translation», one that is actual and involving and one through which
we both appropriate and absorb another culture whilst maintaining a «responsivity» to
it, including what remains «alien» of it.75
In decolonial terms, with the “interculturality” of plural relation cultures would
both in themselves and in the relation combine two seemingly different capabilities.
72Derrida 2003b, 149. Perhaps something more of the force of the unconditional here could be sought
in traditions where hospitality is, or was, close to the unconditionally imperative. For Kant’s limiting
perspective see e.g. Kant [1795] 2003, 15.
73Derrida 2000, 79 – his emphasis.
74Derrida 2003b, 130.
75Menga 2012, 256, 257, 258 – his emphasis.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 2, n. 1 (2014)
The Revolutionary Past: Decolonizing Law and Human Rights 129
With one, the distinct culture has to be able to maintain its “delinked”, limited
being. Yet, with the other there must also be an incorporative orientation towards
the illimitable, towards something of a universality. The very ability of a culture
frequently to embed the universal for its adherents is testament to a culture’s having
some universal orientation, to its extending incipiently beyond any existent. For the
decolonial, this universality cannot, of course, be of the encompassing, appropriative
kind from which the decolonial would itself effect a “delinking”. Which means that
the decolonial cannot claim this universality, this illimitability, for any particularly
realized or realizable entity. Yet, if distinct cultures are to be in a relation, and as we
saw earlier, there has to be some existent, some delimitable commonality embedding
that relation. Yet further, that existent quality, if it were merely existent, would leave
the only commonality available as one where all of the cultures in relation were the
same as each other and their difference in plurality would be lost. Yet still further, if
the commonality were simply illimitable, this would amount to its dissipation, to an
utter failure of commonality. Hence the seemingly paradoxical price of a culture being
distinct yet in a relation of plurality with other cultures is some being-in-common
inhabiting and delimiting each culture “in” its very distinctness.
It would be as well to stress an element of unoriginality in my account of culture.
It accords readily enough with frequent descriptions of culture and cultures. So,
cultures are found to relate «in contexts of hybridity, creolisation, intermixture».76
Or, cultures are «overlapping, interactive [...];» they are «densely interdependent in
their formation and identity».77 And the ability of culture to extend in a receptive
and protean way beyond itself is reflected in such characteristic descriptions as its
being «open, syncretic, and unstable».78 That receptive and protean extension does
«not point to any inevitable action of affiliation», but still there is “in” the culture a
repetitive orientation towards current resolution.79
That still leaves the practical challenge of how in some way to grasp the intercultural,
and how to grasp particularly its ultimate receptiveness, grasp what could be seen as
its unconditionality, and endow it with «meaning and practical rationality», as Derrida
would have it.80 Perhaps observations of the demotic may help.
The first is a case study offered by Gerd Baumann with his intense observation of
the diversity of cultures and of the idea of culture in “multi-ethnic London”, a London
where he finds people able to juggle and connect many different cultures and able
consciously to «reify culture at the same time as making, re-making and thus changing
it».81 Culture thence becomes an «ever-changing ‘complex whole’ [...] through which
people engage in the continual process of accounting, in a mutually meaningful
manner, for what they do, say, and might think».82 When geared towards present
purposes, the elegance of Baumann’s study lies in its showing that the “intercultural”
is an integrating, even a fusion of distinct cultures and of their commonality. Whether
the same could be said of human rights may be debateable.
That issue could be refined in a further visit to the demotic, this time to the
communities where the Women’s Courts in and around Delhi, the Mahila Panchayats,
were established by women quite outside of the formal legal system. Typically,
76Wilson 1977, 9.
77Tully 1995, 10-1.
78Kuper 1999, 13.
79R. Williams 1961, 295, p.295.
80Derrida 2003b, 149.
81Baumann 1996, 12-3 – emphasis on “culture” taken out.
82Baumann 1996, 11.
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proceedings are taken against men for domestic violence or to claim maintenance. As
well as drawing on «local idiom», there is a general reliance on «equitable notions
of jurisprudence and women’s rights», and that reliance extends to the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, a convention
characteristically described as a bill of rights for women.83 This scene would probably
accommodate Baxi’s localized resistant human rights as well as Hopgood’s «lowercase
human rights», also resistant and «locally owned and interpreted».84 Yet there are also
here elements of commonality in which the Convention imports something of Human
Rights in the uppercase. The convention indiscriminately provides an opening to
possibility beyond the existent, and beyond contrary modes and laws whether local or
national. It is one point in a generative oscillation and not simply something stuck in a
primal delimitation. Doubtless also the “locally interpreted” version of the convention
would incline its role towards decolonial commonality – towards its integral relation
to others and not, or not only, towards being distinct and quasi-universal. Yet the
decolonial, as well as the intercultural, would still not be fully effective since the
impact of the Women’s Courts on the Convention in its “universal” guise would
hardly be significant. The intercultural is effected not though some remote reference,
but through the commonality it generates.
Something closer to a «practical rationality» of the intercultural may be found in that
combining of «interculturality and decolonization» manifested in recent constitutional
innovations in South America, pre-eminently «the constitution of the Plurinational
State of Bolivia».85 The prospect hardly seems propitious given the formative force of
“modern” constitutionalism enshrined in the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du
citoyen and its decreeing that «[t]he Principle of all Sovereignty resides essentially
in the Nation. No body nor individual may exercise any authority which does
not proceed directly from nation» (Article 3). Aligned with other contemporary
constitutional changes, the Declaration set the political relation as one between the
unitary sovereign nation and the citizen/individual. And indeed the heft of the new
”Andean constitutionalism” is what has been called the «re-founding of the state».86
The refounded state, taking Bolivia as exemplary, is envisaged as «a social unitary
state of plurinational and communitarian law».87 As such, it embeds constitutionally
a plethora of rights, some similar to the distinctly Human (uppercase) variety but
extending also and abundantly to social and cultural rights, the rights of groups such
as the Indigenous, and rights of participation in the state system, and all matched to a
considerable extent by correlative duties on the part of the state.88
A lacuna remains. The demotic force of the intercultural and the decolonial remains
elusive. This is something Dussel searches for in his Twenty Theses on Politics, a search
fuelled largely by the history of South America.89 Whilst a theoretical wonder in
its advancing the imperative of a participatory “people” who affirm a surpassing
“Will-to-Live”, there is a scarcity of practical exploration when it comes to «the effective
institutionalization of the political project that has been germinating».90 Dussel comes
closest to the effective in two scenarios: one is the recognition of an osmotic process
in which «the demands of movements [...] progressively incorporate those of other
83Magar 2001, 44, 55.
84See notes 67 and 68 above.
85Baldi 2013, 1.
86Baldi 2012, 3.
87Alcoreza 2013, 1
88A conspectus can be found in Alcoreza 2013
89Dussel 2008.
90Dussel 2008, 75, 78, 90.
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movements into their own»; the other comprises the need in the participatory state for
«the electronic revolution in order to reduce almost to zero the time and space required
for citizen participation».91 The two could be seen as connected.
Intercultural connections and collaboration could obviously be facilitated by
drawing on “the electronic revolution” to discover, to form and to effect them through
such means as social media, complexity theory, “big data” and culturomics. And
even as it could be conveniently sceptical to conclude that the invested force of the
occident in such means is predominant, this would be to forget the extensive adoption
of social media within the erstwhile Third World. Such media have of late been
conspicuously successful in the revelation and affirmation of that which is more
«sufficiently human».92
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